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Abstract
In this paper, we integrate the retirement deadline taking into account both labor demand
and labor supply speciﬁcities. This approach reveals that ﬁrms' employment decisions play
an active role in the early retirement decision. We show that, in a walrasian economy, so-
cial security reforms aimed at delaying the retirement age by introducing actuarially fair
adjustments are particularly powerful to stimulate the employment of older workers. Ho-
wever, if real wages are rigid, two situations must be distinguished. First, if the wage
is lower than its walrasian value, the separation date is determined by workers, fair ad-
justments would push back the retirement age. In contrast, when the wage exceeds its
walrasian rate, the separation date is determined by ﬁrms. Trying to increase the rate of
employment of older workers by introducing pension incentives seems to be an unattai-
nable goal. Therefore, there is a good reason for focusing primarily on labor demand. In
this case, it appears that paying a subsidy to ﬁrms is the best policy for attaining the
optimal retirement age.
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1 Introduction
It is now well known that the low employment rate of older workers
accounts for a half of the European employment gap (see OECD [2006]).
Combined with ageing of the population, this trend puts in doubt the ﬁ-
nancial viability of social security systems. There is a large literature which
argues that the decrease in the labor force participation among older workers
is mainly due to the trend of early retirement and thus emphasizes the nega-
tive role played by social security systems. In that literature workers evaluate
prospective streams of wage, pension and social security payments and freely
choose the retirement date that maximizes their expected utility. This sug-
gests that there is large taxes associated to the social security system which
push individuals to retire early. Indeed, the design of the beneﬁts formulas
reveals the presence of a tax on continued activity beyond the normal reti-
rement age : the increase, if any, in pension entitlements due to additional
years of work is often insuﬃcient to cover the extra pension contributions
(explicit tax ) and the forgone pension payments (implicit tax ). In response,
most developed countries have established pension reforms in order to en-
courage the elderly to delay retirement by rewarding a longer working life
with an increased pension. However, such a strategy is questioned by the
employability of older workers. Crépon, Deniau and Perez-Duarte [2002] and
Aubert, Caroli and Roger [2006] argue that older workers suﬀer from a biased
technological progress. Under wage stickiness, this gives ﬁrms incentives to
send older workers into early retirement. Hence, trying to increase the rate
of employment of older workers by introducing pension incentives seems to
be an unattainable goal.
This paper extends the large literature that analyzes early retirement
from a labor-supply perspective and which stresses that the social security
system discourages continued activity after the early retirement age. We in-
tegrate the retirement deadline taking into account both labor demand and
labor supply speciﬁcities. This approach shows that ﬁrms' employment de-
cisions play an active role in the early retirement decision. In addition, we
show that this more general analysis changes the way of thinking about poli-
cies aimed at stimulating older workers' employment. A second contribution
of this paper is to integrate investment on human capital and investigate
the eﬀect of social security system on human capital investment and its
implications on the agents' behavior and thus on the retirement age. By si-
multaneously analyzing human capital and retirement decisions, our model
allows us to spell out various complementarities over the life-cycle. Training
intensity and timing of retirement constitute complements concerning the
worker's optimal choice of labor supply and human capital formation. The
ﬁrst complementarity is that the more individuals work, the larger will be
the returns to human capital investments. And, the more individuals learn,
the larger are the incentives to work as wages are higher. The second comple-
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mentarity is that the later individuals retire, the larger will be the returns
to human capital investments. And, the more individuals learn, the more
costly early retirement will be. We also show that not only the worker's
choices are negatively aﬀected by introducing a social security system with
ﬁxed beneﬁts schemes but also the ﬁrm's decision does : from the worker's
point of view, the social security system implies direct taxes on human capi-
tal investment and labor supply. From the ﬁrm's point of view this implies
an undirect tax on labor demand because of the decrease of the worker's
productivity. Indeed, the worker's productivity at the end of the life-cycle
is a key determinant of the ﬁrm's separation decision. Hence, because the
tax on training intensity reduces the human capital investment of the young
workers, the worker's productivity and thus the ﬁrm's proﬁts decrease when
they become old. This makes production less proﬁtable and thus the ﬁrm
decides to reduce the job duration of the older workers.
We then turn to examine the pattern of policies aiming to restore early re-
tirement to eﬃcient levels. Our results suggest that, in a walrasian economy,
social security reforms aimed at delaying the retirement age by introducing
actuarially fair adjustments are particularly powerful to stimulate the em-
ployment of older workers. However, if real wages are rigid, two situations
must be distinguished. First, if the separation date is determined by workers,
fair adjustments push back the retirement age. In contrast, when the wage
rate exceeds the walrasian rate, the separation date is determined by ﬁrms.
Then, trying to increase the employment rate of older workers by introducing
pension incentives seems to be an unattainable goal in a context where the
ﬁrm's employment decision is more restrictive than the distortions imposed
by the pension system. Consequently, there is a good reason for focusing pri-
marily on labor demand. In this case, it appears that a subsidy paid to ﬁrms
is the best policy for attaining the optimal retirement age. Indeed, subsidies
reduce the production costs of the older workers. This makes production
more proﬁtable, then the ﬁrm decides to increases the job duration duration
of the older workers.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model with
perfect wage ﬂexibility. Section 3 introduces wage rigidities and its implica-
tions for human capital investment, labor market activity and policies aimed
at postponing retirement. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The Eﬀects of Pension Schemes on Agents' Deci-
sions with Perfect Wage Flexibility
2.1 Worker Behaviors
We consider a simple two periods life-cycle model with endogenous hu-
man capital formation and retirement. The length of each period is normali-
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zed to unity. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that agents are risk-neutral
and they do not have access to ﬁnancial assets.
In the ﬁrst period, an individual with productivity h1 works and supplies
a unit of labor. This young employee earns a wage ω1, contributes at rate
τ to social security and consumes c1 units of the consumption good. Labor
income depends on the productivity level : ω1 = ωh1, where ω is the wage
rate per unity of human capital. Then, we can write the income constraint
in period 1 as :
c1 = (1− τ)ωh1 (1)
In period 1, the young employee decides about his human capital invest-
ment in order to maximize his working-life income. Human capital formation
requires eﬀort. We denote the training intensity by e. Disutility from educa-
tion eﬀort is measured by the following training cost function :
φ(e) =
(e)2
2
(2)
We assume that there is no depreciation of knowledge, the level of wor-
ker's productivity in period 2, denoted by h2, depends only on the training
intensity and the worker's ability in the ﬁrst period.
h2 = (1 + e)h1 (3)
Let U1 denote the household's utility in the ﬁrst period. Then, we can
write :
U1 = (1− τ)ωh1 − (e)
2
2
(4)
In the second period, an individual with productivity h2 decides both,
how long he will be active in the labor market, and his retirement date. Before
the moment of retirement the employee has a full-time job. After retirement,
the individual does not work any more : the option of part-time work is ruled
out by assumption. Let zT denote the retirement age of a worker. During
the working subperiod, the old employee earns a wage w2, contributes at the
same rate τ to social security and consumes c2. Labor income depends on
the length of the working subperiod, zT , and on the productivity level, h2,
so that : w2 = wh2zT . Given equation (3), the budget constraint writes as :
c2 = (1− τ)(1 + e)wh1zT (5)
In line with Crémer and Pestieau (2003), we assume that there is a di-
sutility of labor denoted by ψ(zT ), which increases with the retirement age.
In the main text, we consider a simpler speciﬁcation :
ψ(zT ) = γ
(zT )2
2
γ > 0 (6)
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During the retirement subperiod of length 1− zT , the retiree's consump-
tion, d2, corresponds to the social security beneﬁts. Let p denotes the pension
beneﬁts, so we have :
d2 = (1− zT )p (7)
Under these assumptions, the household's utility in the second period is
deﬁned as :
U2 = (1− τ)(1 + e)wh1zT − γ (z
T )2
2
+ (1− zT )p (8)
In a "Laissez-faire" economy, τ = p = 0, a household with ability h1 chooses
the intensity of investment in humain capital formation and the retirement
age to maximize his life-time utility :
max
e,zT
{
ωh1 − (e)
2
2
+ β
[
zT (1 + e)wh1 − γ (z
T )2
2
]}
where β is the time preference factor.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to human capital is :
e = βzTwh1 (9)
The left-hand side is the cost generated by an additional unit of training,
and the right-hand side is the return to human capital investment in terms
of labor income : this investment makes the worker more productive and
thus increases the wage in the second period. The ﬁrst-order condition with
respect to retirement is :
γzT = (1 + e)wh1 (10)
The left-hand side is the cost generated by an additional year of work mea-
sured by the eﬀort cost of labor, and the right-hand side is the increase of
labor income generated by this additional year of work.
These two equations determine the optimal choices of human capital
investment and the date of retirement. They suggest that both e and zT
positively depend on the initial individual's ability, h1. Hight skilled workers
supply more labor. Indeed, a stylized fact is that higher educated workers
have higher participation rates, and low unemployment rates.
The interaction between human capital investment and the timing of
retirement can be graphically illustrated in a (e, zT )-diagram. Assume for
simplicity that there are only two types of individuals : type 1 with a high
productivity and type 2 with a low productivity, so that hH1 > hL1 .
Note that by simultaneously analyzing human capital and retirement
decisions, ﬁgure 1 allows us to spell out various complementarities over the
5
Fig. 1  Interaction between human capital investment and the timing of
retirement
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life-cycle. Training intensity and timing of retirement constitute complements
concerning the worker's optimal choice of labor supply and human capital
formation. The ﬁrst complementarity is that the more individuals work, the
larger will be the returns to human capital investments. And, the more indi-
viduals learn the larger are the incentives to work, as wages are higher. The
second complementarity is that the later individuals retire, the larger will be
the returns to human capital investments. And, the more individuals learn,
the more costly early retirement will be.
2.2 Firms' Decisions
We assume that the worker's productivity is perfectly known by em-
ployers. There is no other heterogeneity across workers. Moreover, any ﬁrm
is free to decide the duration of the production match denoted zF with the
old worker in the second period. The probability of exogenous separation is
zero. Firms are small and each has one job. Risk-neutral ﬁrms maximize the
sum of their discounted proﬁts. To simplify the model, we assume that ﬁrms
have the same discount factor than workers β.
Π =
2∑
t=1
βt−1Πt (11)
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In each period, the instantaneous proﬁt of a ﬁlled job by a worker of pro-
ductivity h1, Πt for t = 1, 2, is equal to the diﬀerence between the worker's
production and the total costs per worker. In period 1, the proﬁt is deﬁned
by :
Π1 = (y − ω)h1 (12)
Where y denotes the units of output per unit of human capital.
We assume that during the second period production requires additional
costs. We also assume that these costs increase with the duration of produc-
tion and decrease with the worker's human capital. Total cost in period 2
is composed of two parts : the wage w2 and production's costs denoted by
ϕ(h1, zF ).
ϕ(h1, zF ) =
f
2h1
(zF )
2 (13)
The proﬁt in period 2 writes as :
Π2 = (y − w)(1 + e)h1zF − f2h1 (z
F )
2 (14)
Finally, we can express the problem of the ﬁrm as follows :
max
zF
{
(y − ω)h1 + β
[
(y − w)(1 + e)h1zF − f2h1 (z
F )
2
]}
and the choice of zF is given by :
(1 + e)yh1 = (1 + e)wh1 +
f
h1
zF (15)
The left-hand side stands for the marginal revenue generated by an additio-
nal year of production and the right-hand side for the marginal costs of this
year in terms of the wage (1 + e)wh1 and the production costs fh1 z
F .
From equation (15), we deduce the optimal separation date for the ﬁrm :
zF =
(y − w)(1 + e)h1
f/h1
(16)
A crucial implication of this condition is that the level of human capital is
a key determinant, not only from the worker's point of view but also from
that of the ﬁrm. Hence, not only the worker's optimal retirement age (zT )
positively depends on the worker's productivity but also the ﬁrm's optimal
separation date (zF ). This suggest that low-skilled workers may be ﬁred more
frequently because ﬁrms refuse to employ them for a long period.
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2.3 The "Laissez-Faire" Equilibrium
Under the assumption of a walrasian adjustment of wages, there is a wage
level that ensures the "Laissez-Faire" equilibrium. According to the dyna-
mics given by the usual adjustment through the supply and demand laws,
the wage is assumed to be continuously adjusted to the current labor supply
and labor demand. In our case, this implies the existence of an employ-
ment contract which ensures that separations at the end of life are mutually
advantageous. Explicitly, this equilibrium is characterized by the following
relationship : zF = zT . Knowing equations (10) and (16), the equilibrium
wage writes as :
w∗ =
γh1
γh1 + f
y (17)
This expression shows that the wage increases with the level of human capital
and the disutility of labor and decreases with the production' costs incurred
by the ﬁrm. Moreover, this wage rate results from a speciﬁc rule of sharing
of output. Expression (17) can in fact be rewritten as :
w∗ =
γ
γ + fh1
y
Interestingly, this equation shows how the wage is ﬁxed according to a speciﬁc
rule : the value γ+ fh1 represents the total cost of an additional year of work
for both the worker and the ﬁrm. This global cost is equal to the sum of the
disutility of work, γ, for the employee, and the production cost, fh1 , for the
ﬁrm. As γ represents the cost for the employee, in terms of the disutility of
working an additional year, the value γ
γ+ f
h1
can be interpreted as the relative
cost supported by the employee in relation to the global cost generated by
delaying retirement for one year. Thus, the output is divided such that each
agent receives a share which is proportional to his relative cost.
2.4 The Eﬀects of the Pay-As-You-Go System
We ﬁrst consider a given Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) System with ﬁxed
beneﬁts and examine to what extent such a system aﬀects the choice of
agents. We assume here that the pension level is independent of the age of
retirement. We then investigate the impact of a social security reform.
2.4.1 Agents' Decisions under Fixed Beneﬁts Schemes
Let us introduce a social security system in which beneﬁts depend only
on the wage income during the ﬁrst period. Let p1 denote the beneﬁt that
an individual receives if he decides to retire at the age of the full rate. We
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assume that p1 ensures the budget balance of the PAYG system for this
retirement age. Then, p1 veriﬁes :
p1 = τωh1 (18)
In this economy, each worker maximizes the present value of his total
utility with respect to the decision variables zT and e :
max
e,zT
{
(1− τ)ωh1 − (e)
2
2
+ β
[
(1− τ)(1 + e)wh1zT − γ (z
T )2
2
+ (1− zT )p1
]}
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to training intensity is :
e = βzTwh1(1− τ) (19)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to retirement is :
γzT = (1 + e)wh1(1− τ)− p1 (20)
We can rewrite condition (20) as :
γzT = (1 + e)wh1
{
1−
[
τ +
p1
(1 + e)wh1
]}
(21)
Conditions (19) and (21), which determine the optimal choices of human
capital investment and the date of retirement, suggest that social security
provisions impose strong constraints on both training intensity and retire-
ment age. First, because the contributions to the social security at the rate τ
reduce the marginal beneﬁt of an increase in the training intensity in terms
of labor income (the right-hand side of equation (19)), the accumulation of
human capital decreases. Second, equation (21) shows that an increase in zT
implies a tax λ = τ + p1(1+e)wh1 , which is known in the literature as a tax
on postponed activity in terms of extra pension contributions and forgone
pension payments.
It is also important to note that not only the worker's choices are ne-
gatively aﬀected by introducing a social security system with ﬁxed beneﬁts
schemes but also the ﬁrm's decision. Indeed, the worker's productivity in the
second period is a key determinant of the ﬁrm's separation decision. Hence,
because the tax on training intensity, τ , reduces the human capital invest-
ment in period 1, the worker's productivity and thus the ﬁrm's proﬁts are
decreased in period 2. Because production becomes less proﬁtable, the ﬁrm
decides to reduce its duration in the second period.
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2.4.2 The Equilibrium with Constant Beneﬁts System
The introduction of a pension system in which beneﬁts are constant and
independent of the duration of activity beyond the normal retirement age
(the end of the ﬁrst period) implies two types of taxes : ﬁrst, from the
worker's point of view, the social security system implies a direct tax rate on
human capital investment and labor supply. Second, from the ﬁrm's point of
view this implies an undirect tax on labor demand because of the decrease
in the worker's productivity. Obviously, this modiﬁes the agents' decisions.
Combining equations (16) and (21), the equilibrium is deﬁned as :
zT = zF ⇐⇒ w = γh1
γh1 + f(1− λ)y (22)
This expression shows that the introduction of a social security system leads
to an increase in the wage rate which is positively correlated with the tax
on labor supply, λ. Consequently, introducing actuarially fair adjustments to
delay the retirement decreases the wage rate as the duration of the activity
increases the additional production costs supported by the ﬁrm.
2.4.3 The Impact of Social Security Incentives
We now introduce a policy aimed at eliminating the tax rates implied
by the ﬁxed beneﬁt schemes. We consider a social security system in which
beneﬁts depend on the retirement age. In particular, pension beneﬁts are
determined as a function of wage income during both the ﬁrst and second
period of work. In this case, social security beneﬁts write as :
p = p1 + p2(e, zT )
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to human capital investment is :
e = β
{
zT (1− τ)wh1 + (1− zT )∂p2
∂e
}
(23)
And the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to retirement is :
γzT = (1− τ)(1 + e)wh1 − p1 + (1− zT ) ∂p2
∂zT
(24)
These conditions can be written as :
e = βzTwh1
{
1−
[
τ − (1− z
T )∂p2∂e
zT
]}
(25)
γzT = (1 + e)wh1
{
1−
[
τ +
p1
(1 + e)wh1
− (1− z
T ) ∂p2
∂zT
(1 + e)wh1
]}
(26)
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Note that the implementation of incentives positively aﬀects the worker's
choices. The social security system in which beneﬁts depend on the retire-
ment age and the wage income during the full duration of work encourages
human capital investment and thus delays retirement. Indeed, the tax rates
on training intensity and labor supply are reduced compared to the system
without incentives. These two tax rates are respectively determined by :
τ ′ = τ − (1− z
T )∂p2∂e
zT
(27)
λ′ = τ +
p1
(1 + e)wh1
− (1− z
T ) ∂p2
∂zT
(1 + e)wh1
(28)
These two equations allow us to characterize the pattern of an actuarially fair
system. In such a system, the tax rates on training intensity and retirement
age are equal to zero. We obtain :
τ ′ = 0 =⇒ ∂p2
∂e
=
τzT
(1− zT ) (29)
λ′ = 0 =⇒ ∂p2
∂zT
=
τ(1 + e)wh1 + p1
(1− zT ) (30)
It is straightforward to verify that these conditions ensure the optimality of
the worker' choices.
3 Real Wage Rigidity and Labor Market Policies
In this section we explore the consequences of introducing real wage ri-
gidity and examine the implications concerning policies aimed at delaying
the retirement age, in particular social security reforms. In the case of per-
fect ﬂexibility, wage adjustments ensure that there is an implicit agreement
between workers and ﬁrms about the employment contract. This agreement
implies that separations are mutually advantageous. However, when wages
are rigid, the adjustment is primarily made by changing the duration of
activity in period 2, not by changing wages. In this context, the retirement
age is not subject to any speciﬁc agreement between ﬁrms and workers. Each
worker maximizes his total utility by taking into account the ﬁrm's decision :
max
e,zT
{
(1− τ)ωh1 − (e)
2
2
+ β
[
(1− τ)(1 + e)zTwh1 − γ (z
T )2
2
+ (1− zT )p
]}
subject to
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zT ≤ zF
Similarly, ﬁrms maximize the sum of their discounted proﬁts over both per-
iods given the labor supply :
max
zF
{
(y − ω)h1 + β
[
zF (y − w)(1 + e)h1 − f2h1 (z
F )
2
]}
subject to
zF ≤ zT
In this context, because the duration of activity in period 2 can be unila-
terally chosen by workers or ﬁrms, the "eﬀective" separation date denoted zE
is deﬁned as : zE = min{zT , zF }. Thus, two cases are possible. First, if the
wage rate is below the walrasian rate, the eﬀective retirement age coincides
with the worker's optimal age : zE = zT . In this case, social security reforms
introducing actuarially fair adjustments are particularly powerful to push
back the retirement age. Second, when the wage rate exceeds the walrasian
rate, it is the ﬁrm that determines the separation date : zE = zF and thus
workers can not attain their optimal retirement age. Consequently, trying
to increase the employment rate of older workers by introducing pension in-
centives seems to be an unattainable goal if wages are rigid. In this case, it
appears that subsidies paid to ﬁrms are the best policy to attain the optimal
retirement age.
3.1 Introducing Labor Supply Incentives
Let us assume that the wage rate is below the walrasian rate. This can
be written as : w = (1 − δ)w∗ with δ > 0. The worker's lifetime utility can
be rewritten as :
max
e,zT
{
(1− τ)ωh1 − (e)
2
2
+β
[
(1− τ)(1 + e)(1− δ)zTw∗h1 − γ (z
T )2
2 + (1− zT )p1
] }
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to human capital investment and
retirement age are given by :
e = βzTw∗h1 [(1− τ)(1− δ)] (31)
γzT = (1 + e)w∗h1
{
1−
[(
τ +
p1
(1 + e)wh1
)
+ δ(1− τ)
]}
(32)
These expressions show that the social security system in conjunction with
the low wage level are two diﬀerent sources of distortion. First, the optima-
lity functions with respect to human capital investment and with respect
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to the retirement age are distorted by the "standard" tax rates imposed by
the social security system. And second, they are shifted downward by the
parameter δ which provides a measure of the real wage cuts. In this context,
introducing actuarially fair adjustments eliminates only social security' dis-
tortions. To restore the optimality functions prevailing in a laissez-faire si-
tuation, the pension incentives must be accompanied by subsidies paid to
workers at level δ(1− τ).
3.2 The Implementation of Labor Demand Incentives
In this section, we assume that the wage rate exceeds the walrasian level
which implies that eﬀective retirement age corresponds to the ﬁrm's optimal
separation date. Consequently, the increase in the employment rate of older
workers can not be attained by introducing pension incentives which are fully
received by workers.
Let us write the wage as : w = w∗(1+κ) with κ > 0. The ﬁrm maximizes
total proﬁts with respect to the duration of production zF :
max
zF
{
(y − ω)h1 + β
[
zF (y − w∗(1 + κ))(1 + e)h1 − f2h1 (z
F )
2
]}
The decision about the retirement age depends on the ﬁrm's evaluation of
marginal revenue and the marginal costs. Thus we obtain :
zF =
(y − w∗(1 + κ))(1 + e)h1
(f/h1)
(33)
This expression shows that the separation date of the ﬁrm decreases with κ.
Indeed, an increase in the parameter κ, which implies a higher wage cost,
makes production less proﬁtable. Hence, the ﬁrm decides to reduce the du-
ration of production in the second period. This implies that workers cannot
attain their optimal retirement age because ﬁrms refuse to employ them a
longer period and, thus, retirement does not result from a voluntary deci-
sion of workers. In that case, the ﬁrm's behavior plays an important role in
accounting for the decrease in employment at the end of the life cycle. It
appears then that policies aiming to encourage ﬁrms to maintain workers a
longer period are particulary powerful to stimulate the employment of older
workers. Such goal seems to be attainable by introducing subsidies to ﬁrms
in order to directly reduce the production costs.
The ﬁrm's proﬁt in period 2 is modiﬁed by introducing a subsidy pi
which reduces the production cost, ϕ(h1, zF ). Given this, the ﬁrm's problem
becomes :
max
zF
{
(y − ω)h1 + β
[
zF (y − w∗(1 + κ))(1 + e)h1 − (1− pi) f2h1 (z
F )
2
]}
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The optimal decision for the separation date is given by :
zF =
(y − w∗(1 + κ))(1 + e)h1
(1− pi)(f/h1) (34)
As it is shown in this equation, the additional costs of production that have
to be supported by ﬁrms for an additional unit of labor demand are reduced
by subsidies. Finally, the value of the optimal subsidy is given by :
pi∗ =
κw∗
y − w∗ (35)
4 Conclusion
This paper is aimed at studying the retirement decision from a labor
supply and demand perspective. Our model includes the ﬁrms employment
decision about how long they must continue production with the older wor-
kers beyond the normal retirement age. Our enlarged approach reveals that
the ﬁrm's employment decision can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the implications of
social security reforms aimed at delaying the retirement age by introducing
actuarially fair adjustments. Furthermore, we integrate human capital invest-
ment decision and investigate how diﬀerent social security schemes may aﬀect
training intensity and its implications on the labor supply-and-demand. The
contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that not only the wor-
ker's choices are negatively aﬀected by a social security system but also the
ﬁrm's decision : from the worker's point of view, social security system im-
plies direct taxes on human capital investment and labor supply. And, from
the ﬁrms point of view this implies an indirect tax on labor demand because
of the decrease of worker's productivity. Secondly, our results suggest that, in
a walrasian economy, social security reforms aimed at delaying the retirement
age by introducing actuarially fair adjustments are particularly powerful to
stimulate the employment of older workers. However, if real wages are rigid,
two situations must be distinguished. First, if the separation date is deter-
mined by workers, fair adjustments would push back the retirement age. In
contrast, when the wage exceeds its walrasian value, the separation date is
determined by ﬁrms. Then, trying to increase the employment of older wor-
kers by introducing pension incentives seems to be an unattainable goal in
a context where the ﬁrm's employment decision is more restrictive than the
distortions imposed by pension system. As a result, there is a good reason
for focusing primarily on the labor demand. In this case, it appears that sub-
sidies paid to ﬁrms are the best policy for attaining the optimal retirement
age.
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